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Abstract
For market games which feature multiple posts for each commodity we show the
following: (i) the ’law of one price’ obtains asymptotically as the number of market
participants becomes infinite, irrespectively of the characteristics of market partici-
pants; (ii) as the number of markets increases the set of equilibria is nested upwards.
JEL Classification Number: D43, D50, C72.
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1 Introduction
The study of non Walrasian strategic market games of the Shapley-Shubik tra-
dition, see (9) (3) (7), has identified two possible sources of the failure of the
’law of one price’. In (1) it was recognized that prices may be ’inconsistent’,
when one allows for pairwise trades among commodities, because individuals
might be subject to cash constraints, which do not allow them to arbitrage
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prices. A different source of failure is identified in (5). In that paper the ’law of
one price’ fails even in the absence of liquidity constraints, because attempts
to arbitrage the price difference alter market clearing prices in an adverse way,
so such attempts cannot be profitable. In brief, equilibria in non Walrasian
markets are compatible with arbitrage either because individuals cannot arbi-
trage price differences or are not interested in arbitraging the price difference.
Either way, equilibria are compatible with a nonuniform distribution of equi-
librium market clearing prices across markets for a commodity. This fact has
been shown to be true both in the market game with numeraire (see (4)),
proposed in (3), and in the market game with fiat money (see (5)) proposed
in (8) and in (7).
In view of this fact, the natural question to answer is whether something can
be said about the distribution of a commodity price across markets and in
particular its variability across markets at any pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the market game. The main result of this paper is that, in absence of liq-
uidity considerations, ’large’ price disparities across posts for a commodity are
compatible only with ’small’ sets of agents. In particular, when the number of
agents tends to infinity, the prices across posts for a commodity corresponding
to any pure strategy Nash equilibrium, converge to a common limit regardless
of the characteristics present in the economy. We believe that this is the ap-
propriate result in this context because, in order for the correspondence ’one
commodity-one price’ to constitute a law, it should prevail asymptotically ir-
respectively of the sequence of economies and the corresponding limit. The
essence of our theorem is that near the limit the law of one price does not
fail drastically. Thus, the main conclusion in this paper is that the ’law of one
price’ is intimately related to the price taking behaviour in markets (at least
by some agents), which is precisely the case in Walrasian markets.
In order to keep things in perspective, we emphasize that our result has no
implication whatsoever regarding the nature of the common limit of commod-
ity prices across different posts. In particular, this common limit need not be
a competitive price. Indeed, our theorem holds true even if the limit economy
is not atomless. The law of one price may be valid in the limit as long as some
individuals (but not all), have negligible effects on market clearing prices. In
conclusion, our result shows that an arbitrarily large number of traders im-
plies that equilibria are characterized by uniformity of prices across posts for
each commodity, but this fact by itself does not suffice to characterize perfect
competition. Apparently some further qualifications are necessary for this.
It is worthwhile to draw here a distinction between our result and asymp-
totic convergence results to competitive equilibria, notably by (3) and by (6)
(who uses the fiat money context as we do here). First of all, those results
have been developed in the single trading post context, where the issue of
non uniform prices does not fit. Hence, they cannot accommodate the issue of
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convergence of non uniform price distributions. An extention of those results
to the multiple posts case, allows the possibility that the price in one market
for a commodity converges to zero, while in another the limit is positive. For
such sequences the limit is a competitive equilibrium (so a fortiori the ’law
of one price’ holds for the open markets), but near the limit the ’law of one
price’ fails drastically. Our result shows that this cannot happen (whether or
not some prices are zero in the limit). In other words our result may serve to
complement possible extensions of results on asymptotic convergence to com-
petitive equilibria to the multiple posts case 2 rather than being captured by
them. Also notice that in the context of market games the common limit of
prices could be zero, which typically is not compatible with competitive equi-
libria, 3 yet our conclusion holds true. Finally, the same remarks apply to the
results on asymptotic efficiency properties of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria
shown in (8), which was also developed in the single trading post context, so it
does not shed any light on the degree of non uniformity of prices at an approx-
imately efficient equilibrium. Indeed, the (approximate) efficiency properties
of equilibria with non uniform prices is an open question, which is beyond our
scope here.
As it is evident in the examples in (1), the qualification for absence of liquidity
constraints is necessary in the above result. Indeed, price differences may per-
sist even in the limit if individuals cannot arbitrage price differences because
of liquidity (or other institutional) constraints. In order to exemplify this pos-
sibility we sketch the construction of an equilibrium with non uniform prices,
in an economy featuring a continuum of agents who face liquidity constraints
(so they cannot arbitrage prices), and a finite number of agents who are not
constrained (but have no interest in arbitraging prices). We can conclude then
that in a frictionless context, the lack of price taking is the only source of
equilibria with arbitrage.
In this paper we use the multiple posts per commodity version of the market
game with fiat money. We begin our analysis, with a simple characterization of
the relationship between market clearing prices across posts for a commodity.
This relationship allows us to draw some interesting conclusions regarding
the configuration of net trades across markets and the corresponding market
clearing prices. Note that our multiple posts version of the market game allows
configurations of net trades which are not possible in the standard framework.
In particular, it allows individuals to buy a commodity in one market and sell
it in another. We prove that precisely such a configuration of trades gives rise
2 Recall that asymptotic price uniformity across posts is a necessary condition for
equivalence with competitive equilibria.
3 Recall that this possibility cannot be excluded. For this reason asymptotic results
had to resort to ’equilibrium points’ (as in (3)), or to the statement (as in (6)) that
the limit is Walrasian ’for the set of active markets’, which of course can be empty.
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to non uniform market clearing prices across the markets for that commodity.
This result generalizes the key idea in the example of equilibria with unequal
prices across markets for a commodity, which was developed in (5). Another
conceivable configuration of trades introduced by our extension of the market
game, is the segregation of the economy into disjoint groups of individuals, who
exchange one or more commodities among themselves in different markets. We
prove that such a situation can never arise at equilibrium.
Finally, we show two results regarding the number of trading posts in a market
game. Those results are rather intuitive, yet necessary for a comprehensive
presentation of the market game with multiple posts per commodity. First,
that the set of active equilibria of a model with any number of posts can be
embedded into the set of equilibria of any model with more active trading
posts. Thus, by augmenting the number of trading posts we do not ’lose’
any equilibria. Second, an equilibrium for a market game with multiple posts,
remains an equilibrium if we consolidate posts where prices of a commodity
are equal. In particular, every equilibrium in a model with many posts where
the ’law of one price’ holds (namely, prices are uniform across all posts for
each commodity) is an equilibrium for the single trading post model. In view
of the example in (5), the inclusion of the set of equilibria of the standard
game into market games with more trading posts can be strict. These last two
results demonstrate that the set of equilibria with uniform prices across posts
for each commodity is invariant to the structure of trading posts.
2 The model
Let H be a finite set of agents and L a set of commodity types. The consump-
tion set of each agent is identified with <L+ and each individual is characterized
by a preference relation, representable by a utility function uh : <L+ → <, and
an initial endowment eh ∈ <L+. An economy is defined as E = {(<L+, uh, eh) :
h ∈ H}. Throughout the rest of the analysis we shall maintain the following
assumptions:
Assumption 1 eh >> 0 for each h ∈ H.
Assumption 2 Preferences are convex, C2, differentiably strictly monotone 4
and indifference surfaces through the endowment do not intersect the axis.
Trade in the economy is organized via a system of trading posts where individ-
uals offer commodities for sale and place bids for purchases of commodities.
A scenario for the rules of exchange is presented below.
4 i.e., if u represents  then for all x ∈ <L++, ∂uh/∂xi > 0 for each i = 1, 2, . . . , L.
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2.1 The Market Game
Bids for purchases of commodities are placed in terms of a unit of account.
Let Ki be a positive integer denoting the number of available trading posts for
each commodity i = 1, 2, . . . , L. The structure of the market game underlying
this economy is characterized by the vector k = (Ki)
L
i=1.
The strategy set of each agent consists of buy and/or sell orders in each trading
post 5 :
Skh = {(bh, qh) ∈
L∏
i=1
<Ki+ ×
L∏
i=1
<Ki+ :
Ki∑
s=1
qi,sh ≤ eih, i = 1, 2, . . . , L}.
Given a strategy profile let Bi,s =
∑
h∈H b
i,s
h and Q
i,s =
∑
h∈H q
i,s
h . Also for
each h ∈ H define Bi,s−h =
∑
n6=h bi,sn , Q
i,s
−h =
∑
n6=h qi,sn . Transactions in each
trading post clear through the price pi,s = Bi,s/Qi,s. A commodity allocation
is determined as follows: For each h ∈ H and i = 1, 2, . . . , L:
xih =
 e
i
h −
∑Ki
s=1 q
i,s
h +
∑Ki
s=1
bi,s
h
pi,s
if
∑L
i=1
∑Ki
s=1 p
i,s · qi,sh ≥
∑L
i=1
∑Ki
s=1 b
i,s
h
eih −
∑Ki
s=1 q
i,s
h if
∑L
i=1
∑Ki
s=1 p
i,s · qi,sh <
∑L
i=1
∑Ki
s=1 b
i,s
h
where it is postulated that all divisions by zero equal zero. In other words if
the value of sales covers individual bids then commodities are distributed in
proportion to bids, while if an individual goes bankrupt all his/her purchases
are confiscated. Consumers are viewed as solving the problem:
max
(bh,qh)∈Skh
uh
(
(xih
(
(bi,sh , q
i,s
h , B
i,s
−h, Q
i,s
−h)
Ki
s=1)
)L
i=1
)
(1)
An equilibrium is defined as a profile
{
(bh, qh) ∈ Skh : h ∈ H
}
which forms a
Nash equilibrium. Notice that, due to the bankruptcy rule above, in an equi-
librium with positive prices individuals can be viewed as solving the following
problem:
max
(bh,qh)∈Skh
uh
((
xih((b
i,s
h , q
i,s
h , B
i,s
−h, Q
i,s
−h)
Ki
s=1)
)L
i=1
)
,
s.t.
L∑
i=1
Ki∑
s=1
bi,sh ≤
L∑
i=1
Ki∑
s=1
pi,s · qi,sh
(2)
5 Restrictions on offer strategies could be written differently. For example one might
allow individuals to ’promise’ offers in each trading post. In such a case some penalty
rule (e.g. confiscation of endowments) would be required to ensure feasibility at least
in equilibrium.
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Given an economy E it will be useful to denote by Ek the market game which
is characterized by k = {Ki}Li=1 trading posts. According to this notation E1,
where 1 is the L dimensional vector with all coordinates equal to one, is the
standard market game with a single trading post per commodity. Furthermore,
we denote byNE(Ek) the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the game
Ek and by E(Ek) the set of consumption allocations which correspond to the
elements of NE(Ek).
In what follows it will be important to understand the role of liquidity con-
straints in this model. Individuals who face liquidity constraints may not be
able to arbitrage prices across posts for a commodity. To see this consider
a situation where an individual offers all of his endowment in trading post
r and bids for the same commodity in another trading post s. Such an in-
dividual may not be able to arbitrage prices across trading posts r and s.
We now formalise this situation as follows. Given a strategy (bh, qh) ∈ Skh ,
let Kbi (h) =
{
s ∈ Ki : bi,sh > 0
}
and Kqi (h) =
{
s ∈ Ki : qi,sh > 0
}
. For a given
strategy profile
{
(bh, qh) ∈ Skh : h ∈ H
}
, define the set:
Ci(b, q) =
h ∈ H :
Ki∑
s=1
qi,sh = e
i
h and K
b
i (h) ∩Kqi (h) = ∅

The set Ci(b, q) consists precisely of those agents who employ a strategy such as
the one described above in the markets for commodity i. Finally, let Ui(b, q) =
H/Ci(b, q). With this notation we can proceed now with our analysis.
3 Equilibria without liquidity constraints
In order to simplify the exposition, in this section we study equilibria where
Ui(b, q) = H, i.e., no agent faces binding liquidity constraint. We begin with
two elementary facts that will be useful in the development. In what follows
we consider an equilibrium of our economy, where at least two trading posts
are active, i.e., prices are positive and there is trade. Let zi,sh = b
i,s
h /p
i,s − qi,sh
denote the net trade in commodity i from trading post s for an individual
h ∈ H.
Fact 1 Consider a budget feasible profile (b, q). For each h ∈ H if bi,sh ·qi,sh > 0,
there is a budget feasible (bˆh, qˆh) with bˆ
i,s
h · qˆi,sh = 0 such that net trades and
clearing price remain unchanged. Conversely, if bi,sh · qi,sh = 0 and bi,sh + qi,sh > 0
there is a budget feasible (bˆh, qˆh) with bˆ
i,s
h · qˆi,sh > 0, which results in the same
net trades and clearing price.
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Proof: See (8).
Fact 2 Consider a budget feasible profile (b, q), where bi,sh = q
i,s
h = 0 and
pi,s > 0. Then for each h ∈ H there is a budget feasible (bˆh, qˆh) with bˆi,sh ·qˆi,sh > 0,
which results in the same net trades and clearing price.
Proof: See appendix.
We proceed with a proposition that characterizes equilibrium prices in two
trading posts for a commodity:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium prices in every pair of trading posts (s, r) of
a commodity i, satisfy the following (no-arbitrage) conditions:
(
pi,s
)2
=
Bi,s−h
Qi,s−h
· Q
i,r
−h
Bi,r−h
·
(
pi,r
)2 ∀h ∈ H
Proof: Notice that the statement is trivially true if one or both prices are
zero, so it remains to prove it for the case where pi,s · pi,r > 0.
Consider any individual h ∈ H. By facts 2 and 1 respectively, this agent can
be considered active on both trading posts r and s for commodity i and in
particular, active on both sides in each post. Fix one such strategy
(
b¯h, q¯h
)
that is best response to (B−h, Q−h) and denote by B¯ and Q¯ the corresponding
aggregates. Taking the total differential of the distribution rule we obtain:
dxih =
Ki∑
s=1
Bi,s−h · Q¯i,s(
B¯i,s
)2 · dbi,sh − Ki∑
s=1
Bi,s−h
B¯i,s
· dqi,sh (3)
Also by totally differentiating the budget constraint we obtain:
Ki∑
s=1
B¯i,s ·Qi,s−h(
Q¯i,s
)2 · dqi,sh − Ki∑
s=1
Qi,s−h
Q¯i,s
· dbi,sh = 0 (4)
Solving (4) for dbi,rh yields:
dbi,rh =
Ki∑
s=1
B¯i,s ·Qi,s−h · Q¯i,r(
Q¯i,s
)2 ·Qi,r−h · dq
i,s
h −
∑
s 6=r
Qi,s−h · Q¯i,r
Q¯i,s ·Qi,r−h
· dbi,sh (5)
Substituting (5) into (3) we further obtain:
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dxih =
∑
s 6=r
[(
Bi,s−hQ¯
i,s
(B¯i,s)
2 − Q
i,s
−hB
i,r
−h(Q¯i,r)
2
Q¯i,sQi,r−h(B¯i,r)
2
)
dbi,sh +
(
B¯i,sQi,s−h(Q¯i,r)
2
(Q¯i,s)
2
Qi,r−hB¯
i,r
− B
i,s
−h
B¯i,s
)
dqi,sh
]
The equation above describes the changes in the final holdings of commodity
i, for feasible ’shifts’ in the bids and offers on the Ki trading posts. Now, in
equilibrium it must be the case that dxi ≤ 0 for all dbi,sh and dqi,sh where s 6= r.
Hence, it must be:
Bi,s−hQ¯
i,s(
B¯i,s
)2 − Q
i,s
−hB
i,r
−h
(
Q¯i,r
)2
Q¯i,sQi,r−h
(
B¯i,r
)2 = 0, ∀s 6= r
which is equivalent to:
(
pi,s
)2
=
Bi,s−h
Qi,s−h
· Q
i,r
−h
Bi,r−h
·
(
pi,r
)2
(6)
Furthermore, notice that the conclusion is independent of the best response
chosen for individual h. Since the same must be true for all individuals the
frst part of our claim is proved 
Finally, we have the following conclusion regarding the relationship between
the prices in two trading posts for a commodity.
Corollary 1 If in equilibrium zi,rh = z
i,s
h = 0 for some h ∈ H then pi,s =
pi,r.
Notice that the above results do not guarantee the equality between prices in
two posts. In fact, we have the following result.
Proposition 2 If in equilibrium we have zi,sh ·zi,rh ≤ 0, where
∣∣∣zi,sh ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣zi,rh ∣∣∣ 6= 0
for some h ∈ H, i.e., there is one individual who makes trades of opposite
signs across the two posts. Then pi,r 6= pi,s. In particular, if zi,sh ≤ 0 then
pi,r < pi,s.
Proof: Suppose w.l.o.g that zi,sh ≤ 0 and zi,rh > 0. By fact 1 it can be assumed
that bi,rh > 0, q
i,s
h ≥ 0 and bi,sh = qi,rh = 0. It follows that pi,s ≤
Bi,s−h
Qi,s−h
and
pi,r >
Bi,r−h
Qi,r−h
. Using these two inequalities along with Proposition 1 we obtain
the following:
(
pi,r
)2
=
Bi,r−h
Qi,r−h
· Q
i,s
−h
Bi,s−h
·
(
pi,s
)2 ≤ 1
pi,s
· B
i,r
−h
Qi,r−h
·
(
pi,s
)2
< pi,r · pi,s
8
Thus, we conclude that pi,r < pi,s 
Remark 1 In a recent paper (2), the authors use a special case of this model
and conclude that equilibrium prices are always uniform across markets. It is
interesting to note that their setup excludes precisely the configuration of net
trades required in the above proposition.
Corollary 2 There is no equilibrium where for some pair of agents h, k ∈ H
and some pair of posts r, s for a commodity i, we have that zi,rh · zi,rk < 0 and
zi,sh = z
i,s
k = 0.
Proof: Suppose that such an equilibrium exists and let pi,r, pi,s be the clearing
prices in the two posts. Without loss of generality suppose that zi,rh > 0 and
zi,rk < 0. An application of proposition 2 to agent h implies p
i,r < pi,s. A similar
application to agent k implies pi,r > pi,s, a contradiction 
Remark 2 The last corollary excludes the possibility of equilibria where two
disjoint subsets of individuals trade a commodity among themselves, in differ-
ent posts.
3.1 Asymptotic behavior of equilibrium price distributions
In view of the fact that equilibria are compatible with a non-uniform distribu-
tion of prices across markets for a commodity, it is natural to wonder whether
something can be said about the dispersion of equilibrium price distributions.
In this section we link this dispersion to the number of agents and markets.
Consider an equilibrium profile (b, q) ∈ ∏h∈H Skh with non- uniform prices.
Let Ti denote the number of distinct positive values that the price of the ith
commodity obtains at the chosen equilibrium. 6 We may assume, by relabeling
markets if necessary, that pi,1 = min
r=1,2,...,Ti
pi,r.
Define: gi (b, q) = sup
{
pi,r
pi,1
− 1 : r = 1, 2, . . . , Ti
}
.
Lemma 1 gi (b, q) ≤ sup
r=1,2,...,Ti
(
bi,1h
Bi,1−h
+
qi,rh
Qi,r−h
+
bi,1h
Bi,1−h
· q
i,r
h
Qi,r−h
)
, ∀h ∈ H.
Proof: Fix one h ∈ H. By simple manipulation of (3) we have:
6 In general, Ti ≤ Ki. However, it may be assumed that Ti = Ki if one wishes so,
because the same profile will be an equilibrium if markets with the same price are
consolidated and markets where the price is zero are disregarded.
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pi,r
pi,1
=
Qi,r
Bi,r
· B
i,r
−h
Qi,r−h
· Q
i,1
−h
Bi,1−h
· B
i,1
Qi,1
=
Qi,1−h
Qi,1
· B
i,r
−h
Bi,r
·
(
1 +
bi,1h
Bi,1−h
+
qi,rh
Qi,r−h
+
bi,1h
Bi,1−h
· q
i,r
h
Qi,r−h
)
≤ 1 + b
i,1
h
Bi,1−h
+
qi,rh
Qi,r−h
+
bi,1h
Bi,1−h
· q
i,r
h
Qi,r−h
Since the same inequality is true for each h, we conclude that
∀h ∈ H, sup
r=1,2,...,Ti
(
pi,r
pi,1
− 1
)
≤ sup
r=1,2,...,Ti
(
bi,1h
Bi,1−h
+
qi,rh
Qi,r−h
+
bi,1h
Bi,1−h
· q
i,r
h
Qi,r−h
)

Lemma 2 Let (b, q) ∈ ∏h∈H Skh be an equilibrium profile with a non uniform
distribution of prices, i.e., Ti ≥ 2 for some i = 1, 2, . . . , L. Then:
(i) Given  > 0, we have : #H ≥ (Ti + 1)
( √
1 + √
1 + − 1
)
⇒ gi(b, q) ≤ 
(ii) If #H > Ti + 1 then g
i(b, q) ≤ (Ti + 1) (2 ·#H − Ti − 1)
(#H − Ti − 1)2
Proof: We show the contrapositive of (i). Suppose that gi(b, q) > . Define
θh = max
{
bi,1
h
Bi,1−h
,
(
qi,r
h
Qi,r−h
)Ti
r=1
}
. By lemma 1 gi(b, q) ≤ 2 · θh+ θ2h for all h ∈ H. It
follows that θh > −1 +
√
1 +  = η(), ∀h ∈ H. Hence, for each h ∈ H either
bi,1
h
Bi,1−h
> η() or
qi,r
h
Qi,r−h
> η() for some r = 1, 2, . . . , Ti. Therefore,
∀h ∈ H, either b
i,1
h
Bi,1
>
η()
1 + η()
or
qi,rh
Qi,r
>
η()
1 + η()
, for some r = 1, 2, . . . , Ti.
Define V =
{
h ∈ H : b
i,1
h
Bi,1
> η()
1+η()
}
and Vr =
{
h ∈ H : q
i,r
h
Qi,r
> η()
1+η()
}
.
We have: #V η()
1+η()
<
∑
h∈V
bi,1
h
Bi,1
≤ 1, so #V < 1+η()
η()
. Similarly #Vr <
1+η()
η()
.
Recall now thatH =
(⋃Ti
r=1 Vr
)
∪V , so #H ≤ ∑Tir=1#Vr+#V < (Ti + 1) (1+η()η() ).
Thus, we have shown that: gi(b, q) >  ⇒ #H < (Ti + 1)
(
1+η()
η()
)
.
Finally, the second claim of the lemma follows directly by solving the last
inequality for , taking into account the hypothesis #H > Ti + 1. In this way
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we have for any  > 0:
gi(b, q) >  ⇒ (Ti + 1) (2 ·#H − Ti − 1)
(#H − Ti − 1)2
> ,
which implies the statement of claim (ii) 
The implication of the last lemma for the asymptotic behavior of price dispari-
ties is crystallized in the following theorem 7 . Consider a sequence of economies
with their associated market structures kn where #Hn → ∞ and a sequence
of corresponding equilibria (bn, qn) ∈ ∏h∈H Sknh . Define zin = #Hn/T ni + 1.
Theorem 1 zin →∞ ⇒ gi(bn, qn)→ 0.
Proof: Since zin → ∞ we have that eventually zin > 1, so according to the
above theorem
gi(bn, qn) ≤ 2z
i
n − 1
(zin − 1)2
.
Thus, as zin →∞ we have gi(bn, qn)→ 0 
4 Equilibria with binding liquidity constraints
So far we have focused on equilibria where individuals were not facing liquidity
constraints. In this section we qualify our resuts for equilibria where some
agents may be facing binding liquidity constraints, i.e., Ci(b, q) 6= ∅. Intuitively,
such agents may not be able to arbitrage prices because of cash constraints.
First, notice that facts (1) and (2) do not apply in this case precisely because
the strategies constructed in their proofs violate the liquidity constraint which
requires that
∑Ki
s=1 q
i,s
h = e
i
h. In this case proposition (1) can be restated as
follows:
Proposition 3 The equilibrium prices in every pair of trading posts (s, r) of
a commodity i, satisfy the following (no-arbitrage) conditions:
(
pi,s
)2 ≤ Bi,s−h
Qi,s−h
· Q
i,r
−h
Bi,r−h
·
(
pi,r
)2 ∀h ∈ Ci(b, q)
where the inequality is strict iff s ∈ Kbi (h) and r ∈ Kqi (h).
Proof: Since
∑Ki
s=1 q
i,s
h = e
i
h, from our assumptions on preferences it follows
that Kbi (h) 6= ∅. Without loss of generality let s ∈ Kbi (h). Consider now the
differentials of the budget constraint and the allocation rule as in proposition
7 The statement of this theorem has been suggested to me by J.-F. Mertens.
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(1). In this case equation (??) has to hold for all db if r ∈ Kbi (h), all dq ≤ 0 if
r ∈ Kqi (h) and all db ≥ 0 if r 6∈ Kbi (h). Hence, the conclusion follows 
Note that as a direct corollary of (3), we can ammend proposition (2) as
follows:
Proposition 4 Let (b, q) ∈ NE(Ek) be an equilibrium where Ci(b, q) 6= ∅. If
for some h ∈ Ci(b, q) we have s ∈ Kqi (h) and r ∈ Kbi (h), then pi,r < pi,s.
Finally, in view of proposition (3), lemmas (1) and (2) have to be restated as
follows:
Lemma 3 gi (b, q) ≤ sup
r=1,2,...,Ti
(
bi,1h
Bi,1−h
+
qi,rh
Qi,r−h
+
bi,1h
Bi,1−h
· q
i,r
h
Qi,r−h
)
, ∀h ∈ Ui(b, q).
Lemma 4 Let (b, q) ∈ ∏h∈H Skh be an equilibrium profile with a non uniform
distribution of prices, i.e., Ti ≥ 2 for some i = 1, 2, . . . , L. Then:
(i) Given  > 0, #Ui(b, q) ≥ (Ti + 1)
( √
1+√
1+−1
)
⇒ gi(b, q) ≤ 
(ii) If #Ui(b, q) > Ti + 1 then g
i(b, q) ≤ (Ti+1)(2·#Ui(b,q)−Ti−1)
(#Ui(b,q)−Ti−1)2
The proofs of the above results are identical to their counterparts of the pre-
vious section with Ui(b, q) replacing H.
We now sketch an example, which shows that when the number of individuals
who can arbitrage prices (i.e, do not face cash constraints) remains bounded,
non uniform prices may persist even in the limit. This example is reminiscent
to the ones in (1).
4.1 An Example
Let (A, µ) be a measure space, where µ is non atomic and µ(A) = 1. Consider
an economy where H = A ∪ {h, k}, i.e., the economy consists of an atomless
set of agents along with two atoms. Suppose that for a given commodity the
endowments of individuals are as follows: eh = 7, ek = 5 and et =
1
2
, µ
ae t ∈ A. Individuals may exchange this commodity simultaneously in two
markets labelled r and s. Let us consider the following profile of bids and
offers, where λ = 8
63
:
12
(brh, b
s
h, q
r
h, q
s
h) =
(
2, 12λ2, 7
2
, 1
)
(brk, b
s
k, q
r
k, q
s
k) =
(
2, 66λ2, 1
2
, 1
)
(brt , b
s
t , q
r
t , q
s
t ) =
(
0, 6λ2, 1
2
, 0
)
t ae
With this profile of strategies the market clearing prices are unequal: ps/pr =
48
63
< 1. Furthermore, the prevailing prices in the two markets satisfy the no
arbitrage condition of proposition (1) for agents h and k. Thus, those agents
cannot arbitrage prices because, as in (5), their attempts to do so have adverse
price effects. Notice that agents t ∈ A face a liquidity constraint: they offer all
their endowment for sale in trading post r and bid for the commodity in the
post s. The above profile of strategies also satisfy the no arbitrage conditions
of proposition (3) for t ∈ A. These agents do not have any effect on prices in
the two posts. However, neither those agents can arbitrage the price difference
because, as in (1), they face a cash constraint: those agents would be interested
in moving sales from the cheaper trading post s to the more expensive trading
post r but they cannot as they already offer all their endowment in trading
post r. Similarly, they cannot transfer bids from the expensive post (r) to the
cheaper post (s) as they already bid zero in r.
From here on proceeding as in (5), we can construct strategy profiles for other
commodities and find utility functions for which the above profile would be
part of a Nash equilibrium one. This example shows how theorem (4) can fail
when the number of individuals who do not face cash constraint (and therefore
can take advantage of arbitrage opportunities) remains bounded.
5 Equilibria with uniform prices
Not all equilibria of the multiple trading posts version of the market game
exhibit non uniform prices. Equilibria with uniform prices do exist and they
are intimately related to the standard single post market game. Clearly, one
can replace an inactive post with more inactive posts and reproduce the same
outcome. However, it can be shown that every equilibrium allocation of the
standard model with a single active post per commodity can be obtained as
a uniform equilibrium of the model with multiple active trading posts 8 . In
other words we do not ’miss’ any equilibria by augmenting the number of
trading posts. We provide here a proof for a game with two trading posts per
commodity. The proof can be extended to the general case via an inductive
argument.
8 In view of the existence proof in (7) this fact is also an indirect existence proof
for our model.
13
Consider the market games E1 and E2 (where 2 is the L dimensional vector
with all coordinates equal to 2). Let x ∈ E(E1) be an equilibrium allocation
corresponding to the strategy profile {(bh, qh) ∈ S1h : h ∈ H}. For each index
i = 1, 2, . . . , L choose 0 < ti < 1 and consider the profile {(bˆh, qˆh) ∈ S2h : h ∈
H} for the game E2, where for each h ∈ H:
(bˆi,sh , qˆ
i,s
h ) =
 ti · (b
i
h, q
i
h) s = 1
(1− ti) · (bih, qih) s = 2
Notice that this strategy profile results in a uniform distribution of prices
across posts for each commodity and the same commodity allocation x as in
the game E1.
Claim 3 The profile of strategies (bˆh, qˆh)h∈H constructed above is an equilib-
rium for the game E2. In particular x ∈ E(E2).
Proof: See appendix.
Proceeding in the same way as above one can establish the following result:
Proposition 5 Given two vectors with positive integer coordinates k, t ∈ <L
where t ≥ k, we have E(Ek) ⊆ E(Et). In particular, any equilibrium with Ki
active posts for a commodity i, can be obtained as an equilibrium with Ti active
posts for that commodity.
The next result establishes that the converse inclusion holds for the subset of
uniform equilibria.
Proposition 6 Let x ∈ E(Et) be uniform,i.e., there is a unique price that
clears all the trading posts where each commodity is traded. Then x ∈ E(Ek)
for all k ≤ t. In particular, x ∈ E(E1).
Proof: See appendix.
6 Conclusion
The central message of this paper is that, the ’law of one price’ and its im-
plications for the relevance of the market structure, is intimately related to
the price taking hypothesis. Perhaps it would be useful to spell out, some
interpretation of our results.
Propositions (2) and (4) suggest that the arbitrage activities of non price tak-
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ing individuals (selling a commodity in one market and buying it back from
another) never exhausts arbitrage possibilities. Therefore, the persistence of
arbitrage in markets where some individuals undertake arbitrage activities,
could be used as an indicator of market power of those individuals, because
arbitrage possibilities should be exhausted if those individuals were price tak-
ers.
With regards to our asymptotic results (1) and (4), note that the rate of con-
vergence does not depend at all on individual characteristics. This reflects the
intuition that ’small’ agents can take advantage of an arbitrage opportunity
just as well as ’large’ agents. Thus, the distribution of characteristics should be
irrelevant for such a result. Indeed, our result is valid even if the limit economy
is not atomless. In other words our result holds true whether or not equilibria
are competitive in the limit. Recall that for the ’law of one price’ to hold it
suffices that some individuals have negligible effects on market clearing prices,
i.e., act as price takers. Of course, this is the case in a competitive market
where all individuals are negligible in the formation of market clearing prices.
On the other hand notice that not all agents need to be negligible in order
for the ’law of one price’ to hold. Therefore, the validity of the law of one
price is a more general issue than the prevalence of perfect competition. The
independence of our theorem from individual characteristics reflects precisely
this fact.
The essence of our result is that, as we approach the limit (competitive or
not), prices in different markets approach one another in an orderly fashion,
so near the limit the ’law of the one price’ does not fail dramatically. This is
very important for the tradition of viewing the economy as a large but finite
one as opposed to an idealized continuum.
Our results on equilibria with uniform prices verify that when the ’law of
one price’ prevails, indeed the market structure is irrelevant. However, the
coexistence of equilibria with uniform and non uniform prices introduces a
coordination issue: given a market game which of the two types of equilibria is
likely that individuals would coordinate on? This question cannot be answered
within the static Nash equilibrium model. This could be the topic of further
research using more sophisticated equilibrium refinements.
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7 APPENDIX
Proof of Fact 2 This is a simple consequence of the fact that every individual
can be viewed as making a ’wash’ sale in the trading posts where he is non-
active. Suppose that for some h ∈ H we have bi,sh = qi,sh = 0. Given pi,s =
Bi,s−h
Qi,s−h
> 0, this agent can be viewed as using a strategy bˆi,sh · qˆi,sh > 0 such
that
bˆi,s
h
qˆi,s
h
=
Bi,s−h
Qi,s−h
. Notice that in this way zi,sh = 0 and p
i,s =
Bi,s−h
Qi,s−h
=
Bi,s−h+bˆ
i,s
h
Qi,s−h+qˆ
i,s
h
.
Thus, the allocation and price remain unchanged with this transformation in
the strategy of individual h. It is easy to verify that the new strategy is also
budget feasible 
Proof of Claim 3 Suppose the claim is not true. Then for some agent h ∈ H
there exists a strategy (βh, θh) ∈ Sh so that:
uh
((
xih(β
i,s
h , θ
i,s
h , Bˆ
i,s
−h, Qˆ
i,s
−h)
2
s=1
)L
i=1
)
> uh
((
xh(bˆ
i,s
h , qˆ
i,s
h , Bˆ
i,s
−h, Qˆ
i,s
−h)
2
s=1
)L
i=1
)
Without loss of generality (see fact 1) we may assume that for each commodity
i = 1, 2, . . . , L, βi,1h ·θi,1h = 0 and βi,2h ·θi,2h = 0. Note that, given our assumptions
on preferences and endowments, the bankruptcy rule ensures that:
L∑
i=1
2∑
s=1
Bˆi,s−h
Qˆi,s−h + θ
i,s
h
· θi,sh ≥
L∑
i=1
2∑
s=1
βi,sh (7)
Given (βh, θh), define: L1 =
{
i : βi,1h > 0, β
i,2
h > 0
}
, L2 =
{
i : θi,1h > 0, θ
i,2
h > 0
}
,
and L3 =
{
i : βi,sh > 0, θ
i,r
h > 0, s 6= r
}
.
- Step I Consider the commodities i ∈ L3 (i.e., the commodities where the
consumer is a net buyer in one trading post and a net seller in the other).
Define a new strategy (βˆh, θˆh) ∈ Sh where for i 6∈ L3 we have βˆih = βih,
θˆih = θ
i
h while, for i ∈ L3, βˆi,sh = tiβi,sh , βˆi,rh = (1 − ti)βi,sh and θˆi,sh = tiθi,rh ,
θˆi,rh = (1 − ti)θi,rh . With this strategy the prices in the two posts of the ith
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commodity would become equal:
pi,s =
Bˆi,s−h + ti · βi,sh
Qˆi,s−h + ti · θi,rh
=
ti ·Bi−h + ti · βi,sh
ti ·Qi−h + ti · θi,rh
=
(1− ti) ·Bi−h + (1− ti) · βi,sh
(1− ti) ·Qi−h + (1− ti) · θi,rh
= pi,r
With this strategy the net trade of consumer h is: βi,sh ·
(
Qi,s−h+θ
i,r
h
Bi,s−h+β
i,s
h
)
− θi,rh .
Notice that this net trade is at least as big as the net trade resulting from the
initial strategy, i.e.,
βi,sh ·
(
Qi,s−h + θ
i,r
h
Bi,s−h + β
i,s
h
)
− θi,rh ≥ βi,sh ·
(
ti ·Qi,s−h
ti ·Bi,s−h + βi,sh
)
− θi,rh
Therefore, by shifting a proportion of the bid (offer) from the first trading
post to the second and at the same time shifting the same proportion of the
offer (bid) from the second to the first, the consumer can achieve an allocation
which is at least as good as the original (keeping the strategy fixed in the other
commodities). Notice that doing so is budget feasible because:
θi,rh ·
(
Bi,s−h + β
i,s
h
Qi,s−h + θ
i,r
h
)
≥ θi,rh ·
(
(1− ti) ·Bi,s−h
(1− ti) ·Qi,s−h + θi,rh
)
We conclude then that if the consumer can improve over the first allocation by
a selling-buying strategy, then he can do so by either selling or buying in both
trading posts. Hence, we can assume without loss of generality that L3 = ∅.
- Step II Consider now i ∈ L1 (i.e., the commodities where the consumer is a
net purchaser in both trading posts).
In this case the total net trade of commodity i is given by:
βi,1h ·
Qˆi,1−h
Bˆi,1−h + β
i,1
h
+βi,2h ·
Qˆi,2−h
Bˆi,2−h + β
i,2
h
= βi,1h ·
ti ·Qi−h
ti ·Bi−h + βi,1h
+βi,2h ·
(1− ti) ·Qi−h
(1− ti) ·Bi−h + βi,2h
In the game E1 the same net trade could be achieved via a bid βˆih that solves
the equation:
βˆih ·
Qi−h
Bi−h + βˆ
i
h
= βi,1h ·
ti ·Qi−h
ti ·Bi−h + βi,1h
+ βi,2h ·
(1− ti) ·Qi−h
(1− ti) ·Bi−h + βi,2h
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which yields:
βˆih =
ti · (1− ti) ·Bi−h · (βi,1h + βi,2h ) + βi,1h · βi,2h
ti · (1− ti) ·Bi−h + (1− ti)2 · βi,1h + t2i · βi,2h
In other words the agent h could receive the same net trade of commodity i
in the game E1 by adopting the above strategy. It can be easily verified that:
βi,1h + β
i,2
h ≥ βˆih (8)
- Step III Now consider the commodities i ∈ L2 (i.e., those commodities for
which the consumer is a net seller in both trading posts).
In this case the consumer’s net trade is : −(θi,1h + θi,2h ) and the receipts from
those sales are:
θi,1h ·
Bˆi,1−h
Qˆi,1−h + θ
i,1
h
+θi,2h ·
Bˆi,2−h
Qˆi,2−h + θ
i,2
h
= θi,1h ·
ti ·Bi−h
ti ·Qi−h + θi,1h
+θi,2h ·
(1− ti) ·Bi−h
(1− ti) ·Qi−h + θi,2h
In the game E1 the same revenue could be raised via the following offer:
θˆih ·
Bi−h
Qi−h + θˆ
i
h
= θi,1h ·
ti ·Bi−h
ti ·Qi−h + θi,1h
+ θi,2h ·
(1− ti) ·Bi−h
(1− ti) ·Qi−h + θi,2h
This equation can be readily solved to obtain:
θˆih =
ti · (1− ti) ·Qi−h · (θi,1h + θi,2h ) + θi,1h · θi,2h
ti · (1− ti) ·Qi−h + (1− ti)2 · θi,1h + t2i · θi,2h
It can be verified that:
θi,1h + θ
i,2
h ≥ θˆih (9)
Therefore, this strategy would give the consumer a net trade in commodities
i ∈ L2 that would be at least as big as the one with offers in two trading posts.
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-Step IV Consider now the strategy
(
βˆh, θˆh
)
∈ <L+ which is defined as follows:
(
βˆh, θˆh
)
=

(
ti·(1−ti)·Bi−h·(βi,1h +βi,2h )+βi,1h ·βi,2h
ti·(1−ti)·Bi−h+(1−ti)2·βi,1h +t2i ·βi,2h
, 0) i ∈ L1
(0,
ti·(1−ti)·Qi−h·(θi,sh +θi,rh )+θi,sh ·θi,rh
ti·(1−ti)·Qi−h+(1−ti)2·θi,sh +t2i ·θi,rh
) i ∈ L2
Using (7) and (8) from above, it turns out that this strategy is budget feasible
in the game E1:
L∑
i=1
Bi−h + βˆih
Qi−h + θˆ
i
h
· θˆih
= ∑
i∈L1
Bi−h + βˆih
Qi−h + θˆ
i
h
· θˆih
+ ∑
i∈L2
Bi−h + βˆih
Qi−h + θˆ
i
h
· θˆih

=
∑
i∈L2
 Bi−h
Qi−h + θˆ
i
h
 · θˆih
=
∑
i∈L2
(
ti ·Bi−h
ti ·Qi−h + θi,1h
· θi,1h +
(1− ti) ·Bi−h
(1− ti) ·Qi−h + θi,2h
· θi,2h
)
≥∑
i∈L1
(
βi,1h + β
i,2
h
)
≥∑
i∈L1
βˆih
=
L∑
i=1
βˆih
Recall that for each i = 1, 2, . . . , L:
xih
(
βˆih, θˆ
i
h, B
i
−h, Q
i
−h
)
≥ xih
((
βi,sh , θ
i,s
h , Bˆ
i,s
−h, Qˆ
i,s
−h
)2
s=1
)
By the monotonicity of preferences we have that:
uh
((
xih
(
βˆih, θˆ
i
h, B
i
−h, Q
i
−h
))L
i=1
)
≥uh
((
xih
((
βi,sh , θ
i,s
h , Bˆ
i,s
−h, Qˆ
i,s
−h
)2
s=1
))L
i=1
)
>uh
((
xih
((
bˆi,sh , qˆ
i,s
h , Bˆ
i,s
−h, Qˆ
i,s
−h
)2
s=1
))L
i=1
)
= uh
((
xih
(
bih, q
i
h, B
i
−h, Q
i
−h
))L
i=1
)
which contradicts the fact that (bh, qh)h∈H is a Nash equilibrium for the game
E1. So our original hypothesis is ruled out and our claim is proved 
19
Proof of proposition 6:
We prove that x ∈ E(E1). The rest follows as a consequence of the previous
result.
Let (b, q) ∈ NE(Et) be the profile of strategies which gives rise to the allocation
x. By assumption: pi,s = pi,r = pi for s 6= r. Recall that by corollary ?? this
implies that for each h ∈ H:
Bi,1−h
Qi,1−h
=
Bi,2−h
Qi,2−h
= . . . =
Bi,Ti−h
Qi,Ti−h
(10)
For each h ∈ H consider the strategy
(
bˆh, qˆh
)
∈ <L+ ×<L+ defined as follows:
bˆih =
Ti∑
s=1
bi,sh , qˆ
i
h =
Ti∑
s=1
qi,sh (11)
Certainly,
(
bˆh, qˆh
)
∈ S1 for all h ∈ H. Furthermore, it is easy to see that
(bˆh, qˆh) is budget feasible for each h ∈ H. With this profile agent h obtains
the net trade:
zih= bˆ
i
h ·
∑
h∈H qˆih∑
h∈H bˆih
− qˆih
=(
Ti∑
s=1
bi,sh ) ·
∑
h∈H
∑Ti
s=1 q
i,s
h∑
h∈H
∑Ti
s=1 b
i,s
h
−
Ti∑
s=1
qi,sh
=(
Ti∑
s=1
bi,sh ) ·
∑Ti
s=1Q
i,s∑Ti
s=1B
i,s
−
Ti∑
s=1
qi,sh
=
∑Ti
s=1 b
i,s
h
pi
−
Ti∑
s=1
qi,sh
=
Ti∑
s=1
zi,sh
Thus, with the profile (bˆh, qˆh)h∈H in the game E1 each individual obtains the
same consumption allocation as in the game Et. It follows that:
uh
((
xih(bˆ
i
h, qˆ
i
h, Bˆ
i
−h, Qˆ
i
−h)
)L
i=1
)
= uh
((
xih
(
(bi,sh , q
i,s
h , B
i,s
−h, Q
i,s
−h)
Ti
s=1
))L
i=1
)
(12)
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We claim that (bˆ, qˆ) ∈ NE(E1).
Suppose not. Then there would exist h ∈ H and a budget feasible (βh, θh) ∈ S1h
such that:
uh
((
xih(β
i
h, θ
i
h, Bˆ
i
−h, Qˆ
i
−h)
)L
i=1
)
> uh
((
xih(bˆ
i
h, qˆ
i
h, Bˆ
i
−h, Qˆ
i
−h)
)L
i=1
)
(13)
In this case consider the strategy,
(
βˆh, θˆh
)
∈ Sth for agent h defined as follows:
for each i = 1, 2, . . . , L and s = 1, 2, . . . , Ti
βˆi,sh =
Bi,s−h∑Ti
i=1B
i,s
−h
· βih, θˆi,sh =
Qi,s−h∑Ti
i=1Q
i,s
−h
· θih (14)
By (11) and the fact that (βh, θh) has been assumed feasible, it follows that
given (ba, qa)a 6=h, the strategy defined in (14) is budget feasible for the indi-
vidual h. Furthermore, with that strategy in the game Et this agent would
obtain the net trade:
zˆih =
Ti∑
i=1
βˆi,sh
Qi,s−h + θˆ
i,s
h
Bi,s−h + βˆ
i,s
h
−
Ti∑
i=1
θˆi,sh (15)
Using (10) we have:
Qi,s−h+θˆ
i,s
h
Bi,s−h+βˆ
i,s
h
=
Qi,r−h+θˆ
i,r
h
Bi,r−h+βˆ
i,r
h
for all s 6= r. It follows that:
∀s = 1, 2, . . . , Ti, Q
i,s
−h + θˆ
i,s
h
Bi,s−h + βˆ
i,s
h
=
∑Ti
i=1Q
i,s
−h + θˆ
i,s
h∑Ti
i=1B
i,s
−h + βˆ
i,s
h
=
Qi−h + θ
i
h
Bi−h + β
i
h
Substituting this into (15) above we conclude that:
zˆih =
Qi−h + θ
i
h
Bi−h + β
i
h
·
 Ti∑
i=1
βˆi,sh
− Ti∑
i=1
θˆi,sh = β
i
h ·
Qi−h + θ
i
h
Bi−h + β
i
h
− θih (16)
But the last term is exactly the net trade that h receives with the strategy
(βh, θh) in the game E1. Hence, we have:
uh
((
xih
(
(βˆi,sh , θˆ
i,s
h , B
i,s
−h, Q
i,s
−h)
Ti
s=1
))L
i=1
)
= uh
((
xih(β
i
h, θ
i
h, Bˆ
i
−h, Qˆ
i
−h)
)L
i=1
)
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Combining the last equation with (12) and (13) from above we conclude that:
uh
((
xih
(
(βˆi,sh , θˆ
i,s
h , B
i,s
−h, Q
i,s
−h)
Ti
s=1
))L
i=1
)
> uh
((
xih
(
(bi,sh , q
i,s
h , B
i,s
−h, Q
i,s
−h)
Ti
s=1
))L
i=1
)
which contradicts the hypothesis that (b, q) ∈ NE(Et) 
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